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Abstract
Despite the peer-to-peer community’s obvious wish
to have its systems adopted, specific mechanisms to
facilitate incremental adoption have not yet received
the same level of attention as the many other practi-
cal concerns associated with these systems. This pa-
per argues that ease of adoption should be elevated
to a first-class concern and accordingly presents
HOLD, a front-end to existing DHTs that is opti-
mized for incremental adoption. Specifically, HOLD
is backwards-compatible: it leverages DNS to pro-
vide a key-based routing service to existing Internet
hosts without requiring them to install any software.
This paper also presents applications that could ben-
efit from HOLD as well as the trade-offs that accom-
pany HOLD. Early implementation experience sug-
gests that HOLD is practical.
1 Introduction
The community has invested enormous energy in
practical considerations for peer-to-peer systems, in-
cluding performance, maintenance, deployment, and
management. Yet despite this practical focus and
despite the community’s obvious desire to have its
systems adopted, specific mechanisms to attract end-
users have not received the same level of attention.
We argue that in the particular case of peer-to-peer
systems, ease of adoption should be elevated to a
first-class concern, for two principal reasons (that are
certainly not novel but bear repeating here): (a) these
systems become most useful when a large number
of people use them, and (b) peer-to-peer systems
are expressly designed for populations of this size,
so understanding how a given system behaves when
massively deployed is especially important.
We believe that a significant practical barrier to
adoption is asking users to install software. We
therefore describe a backwards-compatible front-
end to existing Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
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and Distributed Object Location and Routing
(DOLR) [3] designs that:
 Exposes the key-based routing (KBR) compo-
nent [3] of these systems to Internet users without
requiring them to install any software or modify
their host in any way; and
 Permits end-users who desire a full feature set
to become first-class participants in the DHT or
DOLR (which does require software installation).
Specifically, our approach, which we call Hashing
Over Legacy DNS (HOLD), leverages DNS to pro-
vide a single service: allowing any Internet host to
map an identifier to the responsible node in a given
DHT.1 Rather than try to expose to legacy users the
many other capabilities of DHTs and DOLRs, we in-
stead pragmatically concentrate on solutions that do
not require any end-host modification.
We have identified a useful class of applications
that use key-based routing alone and work transpar-
ently over legacy protocols. Two examples are: (1) a
DNS-based block list for guarding against spam that
would be fortified against the recent DDoS attacks
that plagued centralized versions of an identical ser-
vice [6, 14]; and (2) the back-end of a file sharing
system for finding replicas of desired files.
Our hope is that by exposing these and other ap-
plications to existing Internet users along with a
clear path by which they can become full-fledged
members of the DHT, HOLD can facilitate adoption
of DHT-based systems. Using HOLD, researchers
could seed a DHT with a small initial deployment
and begin to gather data about their system driven
by a large pool of potential users who might be at-
tracted to these DHT-based applications while being
unwilling or unable to install separate software.
HOLD achieves backwards-compatibility via an
1
“Structured peer-to-peer overlays” [3] precisely refers to
the academic peer-to-peer systems whose lowest layer performs
KBR. For brevity, we follow the convention in [7] and use
the overloaded “DHT” to refer to these systems, which include
DOLRs, proper DHTs, and CAST abstractions [3]. HOLD’s fo-
cus is on the common, lower-level function of key-based routing.
1
efficient and effective mapping from DHT lookups
to DNS queries: Internet hosts actually perform
lookups in the same iterative fashion as full DHT
members, but they do so using DNS queries to con-
tact each DHT member along a routing path. We
find that many popular DHTs can be mapped this
way, allowing researchers to use this approach as a
front-end to existing systems.
By pushing the burden of iteration to clients,
HOLD nodes use less state and bandwidth compared
to traditional proxy-based solutions. This difference
is similar to the scale difference between a local re-
cursive name server—which typically handles thou-
sands of clients—and the root name servers, which
scale to millions of clients by providing only state-
less, iterative responses and by depending on client
caching. We believe the same effect will apply to
the HOLD approach, making it more scalable, load-
balanced and resilient than a proxy-based solution.
HOLD maintains a pragmatic focus to facili-
tate incremental DHT deployment, obviously trad-
ing some of the benefits of a pure peer-to-peer ap-
proach for easier adoption. The purpose of this pa-
per is to investigate HOLD, to discuss applications
that could use HOLD, and to understand the trade-
offs that accompany HOLD. We find, perhaps sur-
prisingly, that HOLD is practical and that, for cer-
tain applications, it can provide many peer-to-peer
features, such as robustness and load balancing. In
light of these benefits, we believe that the hybrid ap-
proach employed by HOLD, with its attendant com-
promise of the strictly “P2P” model, merits further
consideration by the wider peer-to-peer community.
2 HOLD: Mapping DHTs into DNS
Our imagined scenario is as follows: researchers set
up a DHT that supports HOLD. They then establish
one or more domain names like mydht.net that
point to a subset of the DHT participants. External
clients perform ordinary DNS lookups (perhaps re-
sulting from following an HTTP URL) on domain
names ending in mydht.net to locate a DHT node
responsible for the given identifier.
Before continuing, we emphasize that HOLD uses
DNS only as an adoption mechanism for DHTs.
HOLD does not provide traditional DNS service (in
contrast with [2]), and we do not claim that HOLD
inherits DNS’s usual features or its performance.
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Figure 1: Finding the node responsible for identifier
x = 3B7D in a tree-based geometry.
2.1 Architecture
The software on the DHT nodes includes a DNS
name server that provides the interface between the
DHT and non-participant clients. The DNS server
replies to queries by consulting the DHT’s neighbor
list and dynamically returning an answer that points
the requester to the next routing hop (via an NS
record) or to the final owner node (via an A record).
To identify the DHT node responsible for an iden-
tifier x, an Internet client first does a DNS lookup
on an appropriate name n(x) (we explain the map-
ping n() below); is then iteratively routed through
the DHT via NS records; and ultimately receives an
A-record with the IP address of the DHT host re-
sponsible for x. Figure 1 illustrates this process.
2.2 Mapping Identifiers to Domain Names
The map from an identifier x to a domain name
n(x) explicitly separates the identifier into digits of a
given radix; each digit corresponds to a sub-domain.
For example, the identifier 3B7D (in radix 16) would
be encoded as D.7.B.3.mydht.net. Although
any DHT can in principle use HOLD, those us-
ing tree-based geometries [7], not surprisingly, map
quite simply into DNS’s strict hierarchy. Two such
popular DHTs are Tapestry [16] and Pastry [13],
both based on work by Plaxton et al. [12]. In these
topologies, each DHT routing step corresponds to re-
trieving an NS record for a sub-domain. DHTs based
on de Bruijn graphs [4], such as Koorde [10], also
map simply into DNS.
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Routing under tree-based geometries reduces to
finding a longest prefix match with the identifiers of
known peers. After k steps starting from any DHT
node, the current node and the node responsible for
a given identifier must match in at least the k most
significant digits. This yields a simple mapping into
DNS names: a node n with identifier I (where I is,
e.g., the hash of n’s IP address) can be responsible
for the sub-domain d
k
.  .d
1
.mydht.net if and
only if d
1
: : : d
k
is a prefix of I . The embedding
of de Bruijn graphs in the DNS hierarchy is nearly
identical, except now N is responsible for the same
sub-domain if and only if d
1
: : : d
k
is a suffix of I .
When a client resolves D.7.B.3.mydht.net
in a tree or de Bruijn geometry, it sends a
query to the mydht.net name servers for
D.7.B.3.mydht.net. mydht.net responds
with an NS record associating 3.mydht.net to
the IP address of any DHT node whose identifier be-
gins with 3. The particular node returned depends
on the contents of mydht.net’s DHT routing ta-
ble. The client then iteratively continues to resolve
its query via the 3.mydht.net node, and so on.
We have designed similar mappings for other
topologies, including those of Kelips [9] and the
“one-hop” scheme proposed by Gupta et al. [8]; they
are elided for space. In addition, owing to the one-
to-one correspondence between returned NS records
and next hops in the DHT, existing DHT routing op-
timizations work without modification. We have not
conducted an exhaustive study, but these compatibil-
ities suggest that the HOLD approach is flexible.
2.3 Implementation Experience
To understand the practical aspects of HOLD, we
built a rudimentary prototype with a routing disci-
pline similar to Pastry’s. Using existing components
for DNS packet processing, we built a small server
that handles requests for a fictitious domain. The
server uses the DNS protocol for all of its operations,
including topology maintenance. The HOLD proto-
type either directly listens to the well-known DNS
port (53) or relies on a server like BIND that can
be configured to forward traffic to the correct HOLD
process after examining only the suffix of the queried
domain name. Thus, multiple HOLD applications
and an existing DNS server can share a port. Our
implementation uses radix 16. Small radices result
in longer domain names; e.g., radix two implies 320
bytes to encode the identifier alone, which rapidly
approaches DNS’s 512 byte maximum packet size.
Our implementation also depends on DNS’s name
compression to fit each message into one packet.
Given our experience with this prototype, we hy-
pothesize that developing HOLD for other DHT de-
signs would be straightforward and quick, with the
caveat that designing any DNS-intensive application
requires some care—each DNS resolver has its own
idiosyncracies that must be handled. We plan to vali-
date this hypothesis by building a production version
of HOLD for several existing DHT designs and by
implementing the applications we describe next.
3 Case Studies
Although the single service that HOLD exports to
legacy users—key-based routing—is only one of
many DHT features, this function nonetheless sup-
ports several worthwhile applications.
3.1 Blocking Unsolicited Bulk Email
DNS-based block lists (DNSBLs) are highly
effective for combating spam. DNSBL pub-
lishers collect IP addresses from known spam
sources and respond to DNS queries like
8.7.6.5.bl.spamcop.net. In this case,
the DNSBL server returns an A record if it believes
the IP address 5.6.7.8 is a source of spam. Mail
servers (e.g., sendmail) and client-side software
(e.g., spamassassin) are easily configured to use one
or more DNSBLs.
Because DNSBLs are so effective and because
their policies for “collateral damage” are controver-
sial (e.g., listing any addresses belonging to an ISP
that hosts a spammer), DNSBLs are frequently vic-
timized by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks. For example, in a well-publicized depar-
ture, the Monkeys.com DNSBL went permanently
off-line in September 2003 due to sustained DDoS
attacks [6]; the Spamhaus project was also the target
of a worm-born DDoS attack [14].
Maintaining DNSBLs in a DHT is an obvious so-
lution to the single point of failure in conventional
DNSBLs. Moreover, by their very nature, DNS-
BLs respond to simple queries using DNS, exactly
the query mechanism that HOLD uses. Hence, a
DHT-based DNSBL (DBBD) is a perfect application
for HOLD. We now walk through an example of a
sendmail server performing a lookup with DBBD.
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 When a sendmail server receives an e-mail
from IP address 1:2:3:4, it checks whether an
A record or an MX record (Mail eXchange) for
4:3:2:1:dbbd:net exists.
 To improve load-balancing, the root server for
dbbd.net hashes 1:2:3:4 and responds that
4:3:2:1:dbbd:net is actually an alias for the
canonical name 4:3:2:1:h
0
:    :h
d 1
:dbbd:net.
 The client automatically queries this canonical
name using HOLD until it reaches the name server
for h
0
:    :h
d 1
:dbbd:net.
 If this name server has 1:2:3:4 in its DHT, it re-
turns an A record for the canonical name. Other-
wise, it replies that no such record exists.
The above scheme works transparently for legacy
clients over existing protocols, but it does not pro-
vide the full resilience of a DHT; in particular, the
dbbd.net nodes themselves are points of failure
and possible attack targets. Because any node can
act as the root, however, a site wanting the full re-
silience provided by the underlying DHT could have
a local node join the DHT and redirect all DNS re-
quests within dbbd.net to that node.
3.2 File Sharing
File sharing typically involves two steps: (1) Given
a set of search keywords, locate a file identifier. (2)
Find replicas of the specific identified file within the
network—a common problem in peer-to-peer sys-
tems. HOLD can export this second function in a
backwards-compatible manner to Web clients.
Content distributors could expose a Web URL
like: http : ==d
0
:    :d
k 1
:cdn:net=get=file.
This URL allows any Internet user to locate copies
of the object with identifier d
k 1
:    :d
0
by simply
clicking on a standard Web link. Unlike approaches
that use external software to download the link, this
technique works entirely within the existing browser.
This URL is a persistent object identifier and thus
invariant under changes in DHT membership.
4 Discussion
Ideally, HOLD would provide the best of both
worlds—backwards compatibility with existing
clients, and the resilience and performance benefits
of a full DHT solution. This section discusses some
of the benefits and drawbacks arising from design
compromises that make HOLD work in practice.
HOLD inherits the DHT’s self-configuration
Unlike conventional DNS systems that require man-
ual configuration when nodes are added or removed
from a domain, HOLD is more resilient: it inher-
its the self-healing and load-balancing properties of
the DHT and automatically reconfigures itself when
DHT nodes join and leave.
Mapping to a hierarchical system involves low
overhead Lookups using HOLD use almost the
same number of lightweight DNS queries as cor-
responding DHT lookups would have used RPCs.
HOLD introduces an additive constant because un-
cached HOLD lookups begin at the DNS root.
Using DNS requires DHT software changes The
HOLD front-end that allows DHT nodes to provide
DNS services naturally requires additional code. Be-
cause DNS uses a privileged and often firewalled
port, not all DHT members will be able to export
the HOLD front-end. Existing peer-to-peer systems
handle similar problems due to NATs and firewalls;
changes to the HOLD mapping to adapt to firewalls
are possible but beyond this paper’s scope.
DNS caching improves performance but may slow
fail-over A root server for the DHT sheds load
quickly via DNS caching. In a radix 16 system,
the root need only hand out delegations to 16 dif-
ferent servers, one for each digit; these answers,
even if they have low TTL, will be rapidly cached
and reused by busy clients. A downside to DNS’s
caching is that inappropriate TTLs could make the
system slower to respond to failures, since clients
would continue trying cached NS records. Determin-
ing appropriate TTLs in this milieu is future work.
HOLD is weakly centralized HOLD’s main (and
unavoidable) weakness is that, from a client’s per-
spective, the DHT front-end is attached to the DNS
at a static and possibly vulnerable address. Fortu-
nately, the symmetry of the underlying DHT means
that each member running the HOLD software can
be the “root” for client requests. This permits, for
example, an administrator to establish a standard NS
record for mydht.net containing, say, 10 differ-
ent IP addresses referring to 10 different DHT nodes
(which are hopefully relatively reliable). As we saw
in the spam block list application in Section 3.1, or-
ganizations or individuals can easily run their own
“root” by simply installing the HOLD software. The
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ability to have multiple roots greatly improves relia-
bility and load balancing.
Security The security of HOLD-based systems is
primarily dependent on open research issues of secu-
rity in DHTs. Because it does not expose the DHT’s
security features to clients, HOLD inherits some of
the weaknesses of the underlying DNS system. We
would like to explore the applicability of DNSSEC
to improving HOLD but must leave it, and the un-
derlying DHT trust issues, for future work.
5 Related Work
Akamai [15] also uses DNS, but does so to direct
clients to nearby caches rather than to expose a key-
based routing service. Zhou et al. [17] apply peer-
to-peer techniques to combating spam by identifying
characteristics of the message body. We instead at-
tempt to provide a traditional DNSBL service, iden-
tifying spam sources. Several projects use DHTs as
the storage and routing of a content distribution net-
work of proxies; examples include CoDeeN [11] and
Coral [5]. These projects expose a front-end proxy
permitting Web clients to access CDN-based storage
and retrieval. HOLD compliments these approaches
by exporting key lookup to clients in cases when
copying data through the CDN nodes is undesirable.
Freenet [1] also exposes its file sharing services via
a Web interface to legacy clients.
6 Summary and Future Work
HOLD takes a conceptually impure approach to
building adoptable peer-to-peer systems, sacrificing
some benefits to provide a practical migration path
for users. With HOLD, people can use a peer-to-peer
system before installing software. Our positive expe-
rience with the HOLD prototype, and its applicabil-
ity to two example systems, makes us believe that the
HOLD approach is worthwhile. We plan to augment
the prototype and to implement these HOLD-based
applications. We hope that HOLD’s techniques, and
its attendant pragmatic compromises, can facilitate
the adoption of other peer-to-peer applications.
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